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TIMES UP!: THE HARSH REALITY OF THE POWER OF THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION
ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS
By
Linnea Ignatius
∗

I.

INTRODUCTION
The victory of having an arbitral tribunal decide on your behalf starts a

new process: the quest for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. In
Yugraneft Corporation v. Rexx Management Corporation1, the Supreme Court of
Canada addressed the limitation period applicable to the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the province of Alberta.2 Under
international arbitration law, any limitation period is left to the procedural law of
the jurisdiction in which the enforcement and recognition of the award is being
sought.3 By holding that Yugraneft’s claim to enforce the Russian arbitral award
was brought after the expiry of the applicable local period of limitation, the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision of two lower courts.4
II.

BACKGROUND
Yugraneft Corporation (hereinafter Yugraneft), the appellant, is a Russian

corporation that develops and operates oil fields in Russia.5 Rexx Management
Corporation (hereinafter Rexx), the respondent, is a Canadian (Alberta)
corporation who at one time supplied materials to Yugraneft for its oil field

Linnea Ignatius is a 2012 Juris Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University
Dickinson School of Law.
1
Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Management Corp., 2010 SCC 19, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 649. 20 May
2010.
2
Id. at ¶ 1.
3
Id.
4
Id. at ¶ 65.
5
Id.
∗
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operations.6 Following a contractual dispute, Yugraneft commenced arbitral
proceedings before the International Commercial Court at the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation (hereinafter Russian ICAC).
The Russian ICAC tribunal rendered its final award on September 6, 20027 and
ordered Rexx to pay $952,614.43 in damages to Yugraneft.8
In an effort to collect their award, Yugraneft applied to the Alberta Court
of Queen’s Bench for recognition and enforcement of the $952,614.43 award on
January 27, 2006.9 The arbitral tribunal rendered the award three years earlier.
Rexx resisted the enforcement on two grounds.10 Rexx first argued that
Yugraneft’s application was time-barred under the Alberta Limitations Act.11 Next,
Rexx argued to stay the enforcement proceedings pending resolution of an ongoing
criminal case in the United States.12 Rexx claimed that waiting for the resolution of
the criminal case in an American court would have shown that fraudulent activity
led to the initial award.
III.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, Yugraneft applied for

enforcement of the award pursuant to the International Commercial Arbitration
Act, R.S.A. 2000, clause 1-5 (hereinafter ICAA).13 The Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench determined that the application was time-barred under the Limitations Act.14
The Act consists of two periods of limitation. The first, Section 3, is for “remedial
orders” and the second, Section 11, is for the enforcement of “judgment[s] or
6

Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 2
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id. at ¶ 3.
10
Id.
11
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 3.
12
Id.
13
Id. at ¶ 4.
14
Id.
7
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order[s] for the payment of money”.15 Applications under Section 3 are subject to a
two-year period of limitation and applications under Section 11 are subject to a
ten-year limitation.16 The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench disagreed with
Yugraneft’s claim that foreign arbitral awards were to be considered “judgments”
as per Section 11, leading to the ten-year limitation.17 Instead, the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench found that the two-year limitation under Section 3 applied to the
award.18 Upon these findings, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed the
application.19 The Alberta Court of Appeals (hereinafter Court of Appeals),
unanimously upheld the decision on appeal. The Court of Appeals also ruled that a
foreign arbitral award did not fall under the auspices of Section 11 and could not
be considered a “judgment” as defined by the section.20 The Court of Appeals held
that the term only encompassed domestic judgments.21 The Court of Appeals
further stated that because the award was not considered a judgment, it must be
considered under Section 3, and thus only had a two-year period of limitation. The
appeal was therefore dismissed.22
IV.

STANCES OF THE PARTIES

A.

Yugraneft
Yugraneft claimed that a foreign arbitral award, such as theirs, should be

treated as a domestic judgment under Section 11.23 Yugraneft claimed this under
the theory that arbitration was an adjudication of a legal dispute, and accordingly

15

Id.
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 4.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at ¶ 5.
21
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 5.
22
Id.
23
Id. at ¶ 6.
16
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possessed all of the characteristics of a judgment.24 Additionally, Yugraneft argued
that foreign arbitral awards should at least be treated as being equal to a foreign
judgment.25 They felt that this was an important identifier because foreign
judgments fell within the meaning of a “judgment” under Section 11 of the
Limitations Act.26 Yugraneft then pointed to various decisions to demonstrate that
recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada showed a trend of stepping
away from the traditional concept of foreign judgments toward a more novel trend
of granting them “full faith and credit”.27 Lastly, Yugraneft pointed to the latent
ambiguity of the Limitations Act, stating that such ambiguity should be resolved in
its favor.28 They concluded that statutory provisions that create periods of
limitation must be interpreted strictly in favor of the plaintiff, thus providing
Yugraneft the ten-year period of limitation.29
B.

Rexx
Rexx simply stated that the two-year limitation found under Section 3

should apply to the award.30 Rexx claimed that the Limitations Act was intended to
streamline the law of limitations by creating a single limitation period for most
causes of action.31 Rexx further claimed that unless an action falls under one of the
few exceptions set out in the Act, the Section 3 two-year bar will apply.32 Rexx
concluded that because Yugraneft’s action was not excluded from the scope of
Section 3, it was time-barred.33
24

Id.
Id.
26
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 6.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at ¶ 7.
31
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 7.
32
Id.
33
Id.
25
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V.

ANALYSIS BY THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

A.

Overview

451

The Supreme Court of Canada (hereinafter the Court) began by stating
that, in Alberta, the recognition of foreign arbitral awards is governed by the
ICAA, which merges both the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter the “Convention”34) and the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (hereinafter the “Model
Law”35) into Alberta law.36 Because Alberta adopted both the Convention and the
Model Law in 1986, the Court stated there was no doubt that Alberta was required
to recognize and enforce eligible foreign arbitral awards.37 Considering this, the
Court found that the question before it was what limitation period applied to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.38
Article III of the Convention stipulates that recognition and enforcement
shall be “in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award
is relied upon.”39 Thus, the Court stated that the rules of procedure of the
jurisdiction in which enforcement was sought should apply, so long as they did not
directly conflict with express requirements of the Convention.40 This conclusion
brought the Court to its second question: Whether or not limitation periods fall

34

The purpose of the Convention is to facilitate the cross-border recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards by establishing a single, uniform set of rules that apply
worldwide. Over 140 countries have currently ratified the Convention.
35
The United Nations Commission on International Trade created the Model Law and is a
codification of international “best practices” intended to serve as an example for domestic
legislation.
36
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 8.
37
Id. at ¶ 12.
38
Id.
39
Id. at ¶ 15.
40
Id.
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under the rubric of “rules of procedure” as the term is used in the Convention.41
The Court addressed this question because not all legal systems treated periods of
limitation the same. The Court noted that systems built on common law traditions
have tended to consider periods of limitation as procedural matters, whereas those
following civil law traditions usually consider them to a be a question of
substantive law.42 This division was important because if periods of limitation are
considered substantive in nature, then placing a time limit on the recognition and
enforcement proceedings would seemingly violate the Convention because it
would only allow local procedural rules to apply.43
Both parties agreed that Article III of the Convention allowed states that
are party to the Convention to impose a time limit on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.44 But whether Alberta conformed to the
Convention is not determined by the consent of the parties, thus it was necessary
for the Court to determine whether there was a legal basis for the application of
local limitation laws under the Convention.45
B.

The Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that Article III permits, but does not necessarily require

Contracting States, or as in this case, a sub-national territory of a Contracting State,
to subject the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award to a time
limit.46 The Court held that the phrase, “in accordance with the rules of procedure
of the territory where the award is relied upon” should be read as indicating the

41

Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 15.
Id. at ¶ 16 (citing Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, at pp. 1068-1070).
43
Id.
44
Id. at ¶ 17.
45
Id.
46
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 18.
42
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application of domestic law on such matters.47 Further, the Court held that the
courts of a Contracting State may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral
award on the basis that such proceedings are time-barred. The Court provided three
reasons for its conclusion.48
1.

Vast Application of the Convention’s Text

The Court’s first line of reasoning for its conclusion drew from its
interpretation of the Convention. The Court stated that, as a treaty, according to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Convention must be interpreted “in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”49 Relying on this
language, the Court stated that the Convention’s text was created to be applied in a
large number of States, and therefore across a plethora of legal systems.50 The
Court plainly stated that the text of the Convention must be construed in a manner
that respected the fact that it was intended to interface with a variety of legal
traditions.51
The Court held that this notion was important when interpreting the
Convention’s effect on the applicability of local periods of limitation to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.52 Further, the Court stated
that when the Convention was drafted, it was a well-known fact that various States
defined limitation periods in different ways, and that common law States
traditionally treated them as being procedural in nature.53 The Court found it

47

Id.
Id.
49
Id. at ¶ 19 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), January 27, 1980,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331).
50
Id. (citing NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 868 (Oxford University Press 2007) (1986)).
51
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 19.
52
Id. at ¶ 20.
53
Id.
48
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extremely significant that the Convention’s drafters did not include any restriction
on a State’s ability to impose time limits on recognition and enforcement
proceedings.54 The Court held that an omission such as this implied that the
drafters of the Convention intended to take a permissive approach.55
2.

Common Practice of Contracting States

Second, the Court held that Article III should be viewed as permitting the
application of local periods of limitation because that was the common practice of
Contracting States. Basing it decision once again on the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, the Court cited that when interpreting a treaty, a court must take
into account “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”.56 Further, a
recent study indicated that at least 53 Contracting States subject, or would subject,
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards to some sort of time
limit.57
3.

A Lack of Controversy and Explicit Restriction

Lastly, the Court supported its holding by stating that leading scholars in
the field appear to take for granted that Article III permits the application of local
periods of limitation to recognition and enforcement proceedings.58 Considering
this, the Court held that this suggested that the application of local time limits is

54

Id.
Id.
56
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 21 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)).
57
Id. (citing UNCITRAL, Report on the survey relating to the legislative implementation
of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 2-3,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/656/Add.1 (2008)).
58
Id. at ¶ 22.
55
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not a controversial matter.59 Further, the Court explained that the lack of any
explicit restriction of a Contracting State’s ability to impose a limitation period
could mean that any limitation period that is applicable under domestic law to the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is a “rule of procedure”
pursuant to Article III.60
C.

Interveners: The Canadian Arbitration Congress and the ADR Chambers
The Canadian Arbitration Congress (hereinafter CAC) and the ADR

Chambers argued that, on the facts of the present case, Article III of the
Convention prevented the Court from applying Alberta period of limitation laws.61
Interestingly, each of the groups relied on different parts of Article III to support
its claim.62 The CAC argued that the Alberta law could not apply to the recognition
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards since Canadian common law considers
rules such as these to be substantive in nature.63 Further, the CAC argued that the
Limitations Act, or any other statute imposing a general limitation period, does not
qualify as a “rule of procedure” under Article III.64 The CAC then cited Tolofson,
which the Court had referenced earlier in its decision (and which rejected the
traditional common law approach to limitation periods), to support its claim.65
The Court agreed that the majority in Tolofson held that, in a conflict of
law context, periods of limitation should generally be treated as substantive in
nature, so that a claim will be subject to the limitation period of the lex loci delicti
or lex loci contractus.66 The Court stated, however, that the question in this case
was not whether Canadian law considered limitation periods to be substantive or
59

Id.
Id.
61
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 24.
62
Id. at ¶ 25.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at ¶ 26.
66
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 27.
60
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procedural in nature, but rather whether local time limits were meant to apply to
recognition and enforcement and thus fall within the ambit of “rules of procedure”
as that term is used in Article III of the Convention.67 The Court held that the
answer to the actual question must be yes, because, as noted above, the Convention
takes a permissive approach to the applicability of local limitation periods.68 Next,
the Court stated that the only material question was whether a competent
legislature intended to subject recognition and enforcement proceedings to a period
of limitation and thus Tolofson was not relevant to the case at hand.69 With this
reasoning, the Court held that the CAC’s contentions were misplaced.70 The Court
held the contentions to be misplaced because even if it were to characterize a given
statutory period of limitation, such as the one found in Section 3 of the Limitations
Act, as substantive in nature, that would not in and of itself prevent the limitation
period in question from being applicable to the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards.71
In the same vein, the second intervener, the ADR Chambers, argued that
Article III prevented the Limitations Act from applying to the Yugraneft’s action.72
The ADR Chambers argued that Article III of the Convention barred Alberta from
imposing a limitation period shorter than the longest limitation period available
anywhere in Canada for the recognition and enforcement of domestic arbitral
awards.73 The ADR Chambers read Article III74 to say that a “domestic” arbitral

67

Id.
Id. at ¶ 28.
69
Id.
70
Id. at ¶ 29.
71
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 29.
72
Id. at ¶ 30.
73
Id.
74
Art. III of the Convention states, “[t]here shall not be imposed substantially more
onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral
awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or
enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.”
68
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award means any award rendered within the Contracting State.75 Reading it as
such, they stated that no Canadian province could impose a time limit more
onerous than the most generous time limit available anywhere in Canada for
domestic awards.76 The ADR Chamber then noted that both Quebec and British
Columbia provide a ten-year limitation period on the recognition of arbitral awards
rendered in within the province.77 Based on these notions, the ADR Chamber
concluded that under the Convention, Alberta was prohibited from imposing a time
limit shorter than 10 years on the recognition of foreign arbitral awards.78
The Court rejected the claims of the ADR Chamber because the position it
advanced was fundamentally at odds with Canada’s federal constitution.79 Under
the Canadian federal constitution, the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards is a matter that falls within provincial jurisdiction.80 Further, the Court held
that it would be against the Canadian constitution to allow the legislation of one
province to dictate the range of legislative options available to another province
about matters within each province’s exclusive jurisdiction.81 The Court also stated
that the Chamber’s position rested on a misreading of the Convention, which
intended to respect the internal constitutional order of Contracting States.82 For the
reasons stated above, the Court concluded by stating that it disagreed with the
ADR Chamber’s contention that applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act to
foreign arbitral awards would place Canada (or Alberta, for that matter) in any sort
of violation of its international obligations.83
Lastly, in response to the claims by the CAC and the ADR Chamber, the
Court held that it must conclude that the New York Convention was meant to
75

Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 31.
Id.
77
Id. (citing CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2924; Limitation Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c. 266).
78
Id.
79
Id. at ¶ 32.
80
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 32 (citing the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K)).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
76
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allow Contracting States to impose local times limits on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards if they wished to do so.84 When dealing
with federal states, as in this case, the law of the enforcing jurisdiction within the
federal state determined such limitations.
D.

What Period of Limitation, if Any, Applies to the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under Alberta Law?
After addressing the issues brought up by the interveners, the Court turned

to the issue of whether Alberta law subjected the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards to a period of limitation.85 In answering this question, the
Court determined that only one of the sources of law suggested by the parties and
interveners applied to the case - the Limitations Act.86 The Limitations Act
contains Alberta’s general law of limitations and it did not exclude Yugraneft’s
award from its scope.87 Importantly, the Court noted that the purpose of the
Limitations Act was to streamline the law of limitations by limiting the number of
exceptions and providing a uniform limitation period for most actions.88 The Court
cited to the inclusive nature of the Act by looking to Section 2(1), which provides
that the Act applied in all cases where a claimant seeks a “remedial order”.89
Article 1(i) defines a remedial order as “a judgment or an order made by a court in
a civil proceeding requiring a defendant to comply with a duty or to pay damages
for the violation of a right”.90 The Court found this “very broad” language included

84

Id. at ¶ 34.
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 35.
86
Id.
87
Id. at ¶ 36.
88
Id.
89
Id. at ¶ 37.
90
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 37.
85
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nearly any order that a court my grant in a civil proceedings.91 Further, the Act
excluded only certain types of relief, none of which were involved in this case.92
To bolster its ruling on the comprehensive nature of the Act, the Court
continued by discussing Section 12.93 Section 12 is a provision that was
specifically designed to counteract the effects of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in Tolofson in a conflict of laws situation.94 Section 12 provides that,
“[t]he limitations law of Alberta applies to any proceeding commenced or sought
to be commenced in Alberta in which a claimant seeks a remedial order”.95 This
phrasing ensured that all proceedings brought within Alberta were subject to the
local period of limitation, regardless of any other limitation period that may also be
applicable pursuant to a conflict of laws analysis similar to Tolofson.96 The Court
further opined that Section 12 ensured that Alberta’s limitations law applied to
claims subject to foreign law, thus indicating that the Limitations Act intended to
apply to all claims for a remedial order not expressly excluded by statute.97
VI.

CONCLUSION BY THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
After delving through the arguments made by the two parties and three

interveners (arguments by the London Court of International Arbitration are not
addressed in this paper), the Court concluded by addressing the final issue: how to
characterize an application for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award under the Limitations Act.98 In answering this question, the Court stated that
the Act essentially creates three avenues, each subject to a different period of

91

Id.
Id.
93
Id. at ¶ 38.
94
Id.
95
The Alberta Limitations Act, R.S.A., ch. L 12 (2000).
96
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 38.
97
Id. at ¶ 39.
98
Id. at ¶ 42.
92
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limitation: ten years, two years, or no period of limitation.99 In this breakdown, an
application for a remedial order based on a “judgment or order for the payment of
money” is subject to a ten-year period of limitation.100 All other applications for a
remedial order fall under a two-year period of limitation.101 Lastly, all other
judgments or orders that are not remedial as defined in Section 1(i) are not subject
to a limitation period.102 Yugraneft’s key argument was that an arbitral award is
akin to a judgment and that an application for recognition and enforcement of that
award is therefore a “claim based on a judgment or order for payment of money”
under Section 11 of the Act, and thus subject to the ten-year limitation period.103
The Court rejected this position because an arbitral award is not a
judgment or a court order, and Yugraneft’s application fell outside of the scope of
Section 11.104 Additionally, the Court held that applying the ten-year limitation to
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards would result in an
incoherent limitations regime.105 Specifically, in Alberta, arbitral awards from
reciprocating jurisdictions are subject to a six-year time limit. The Court held that
“it would be incongruous to accord foreign arbitral awards from non-reciprocating
jurisdictions more favorable treatment than those from jurisdictions with which
Alberta has deliberately concluded an agreement for the reciprocal enforcement of
judgments”.106
Finally, the Court stated that the limitation period set out in Section 3 was
consistent with the overall scheme of Alberta limitation law. The Court found that
this decision provided a more generous treatment for foreign arbitral awards than

99

Id.
Id. at ¶ 42 (citing The Alberta Limitations Act, § 11).
101
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 44 (citing The Alberta Limitations Act, § 3).
102
Id. at ¶ 42.
103
Id. at ¶ 43.
104
Id. at ¶ 44.
105
Id. at ¶ 47.
106
Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 48.
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for domestic awards and thus was consistent with Article III of the Convention.107
Because the Court found that Yugraneft’s application for recognition and
enforcement was indeed subject to Section 3 of the Limitations Act, the Court was
left with the final question of whether the application was time-barred when it was
filed on January 27, 2006.108 The two-year period of limitation is subject to a
discoverability rule and the period of limitation only starts to run if the conditions
for discoverability are met.109 Also, under Section 3, “a claim for a remedial order
must be brought within two years after the claimant first knew, or in the
circumstances ought to have known, (i) that the injury for which the claimant seeks
a remedial order had occurred, (ii) that the injury was attributable to conduct of the
defendant, and (iii) that the injury, assuming liability on the part of the defendant,
warrants bringing a proceeding…”110 In this case, the injury is “non-performance
of an obligation” - Rexx’s failure to comply with the arbitral award and pay
Yugraneft $952,614.43.111
In order to determine whether the enforcement has been time-barred, a
court must ascertain when the injury occurred.112 For the case at hand, the Court
had to determine when the non-performance occurred.113 The Model Law provides
that a party to an arbitration has three months to apply to the local courts to have
an award set aside, starting on the day that it receives the award.114 The Court held
that the limitation period under Section 3 of the Limitations Act would not be
triggered until the possibility that the award might be set aside by the local courts
in the country where the award was rendered has been totally exhausted.115

107

Id. at ¶ 49.
Id. at ¶ 50.
109
Id.
110
Id.
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Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 50.
112
Id. at ¶ 52.
113
Id.
114
Id. at ¶ 54.
115
Id.
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Russia is a Model Law jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court held that for

the purposes of the Limitations Act, Rexx’s obligations under the award did not
solidify until three months after Yugraneft had received the award.116 The award
was issued on September 6, 2002, and Yugraneft did not offer any indication that it
received the award at a later date.117 Thus, adding three months to this date,
Yugraneft would have had two years from December 6, 2002, to commence
proceedings against Rexx in Alberta.118 The action was not brought until January
27, 2006, so it was clearly time-barred.119 The Court concluded that even taking
into account the discoverability rule in Section 3(1)(a) of the Limitations Act,
Yugraneft’s proceedings were time-barred.120
VII.

CONCLUSION
In Yugraneft Corporation v. Rexx Management Corporation, the Supreme

Court of Canada chose to resist enforcement and recognition of the award on the
basis of a provincial limitation as opposed to any of the enumerated grounds for
refusal found within the New York Convention or portions of the Model Law. This
decision demonstrates the power of local and national courts over the arbitral
process.
In conclusion, though victors of arbitral proceedings have some leeway in
deciding where to have their award enforced and recognized, Yugraneft v. Rexx
Management Corp sheds important light on the fact that the victors must be well
aware of the statutory limitations of the area where they wish to enforce the award.
Failing to pay careful attention to issues such as periods of limitation can truly
spoil the potential to obtain the relief that has been afforded to a victor in an
116

Yugraneft Corp. at ¶ 56.
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at ¶ 63.
117
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arbitral ruling. International arbitration provides attractive qualities, such as the
finality of decisions, but they come at a price. Those participating in the process
must be vigilant from the beginning of arbitral proceedings until they have the
award in the pockets; the loser in most cases will not simply hand the award over
to the victor at the end of the arbitral proceedings.

